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The concept of order that has underpinned the modern era
is in crisis, writes Henry Kissinger. Above, a pro-Russian fighter
stands guard at a checkpoint close to Donetsk, Ukraine in July.
European Pressphoto Agency
Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist
armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and
Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these
troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a
relationship with China divided between pledges of cooperation and
public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned the
modern era is in crisis.
The search for
world order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of
Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the
U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to take
up the torch of international leadership and added a new dimension. A
nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative
governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty
and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just
and lasting peace.
The traditional European approach to order had viewed
peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects
of their clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a
concert of enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered
people inherently reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise
and common sense; the spread of democracy was therefore the overarching
goal for international order. Free markets would uplift individuals,
enrich societies and substitute economic interdependence for traditional
international rivalries. 
In the Middle East, religious militias violate borders at will.
Getty Images
This effort to establish world order
has in many ways come to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign
states govern most of the world's territory. The spread of democracy and
participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not a
universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate
in real time.
The years from perhaps
1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history
when one could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an
amalgam of American idealism and traditional European concepts of
statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the world have never
shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order. These
reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine
crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by
the West stands at a turning point.
First, the nature of the state
itself—the basic formal unit of international life—has been subjected to
a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out to transcend the state and
craft a foreign policy based primarily on the principles of soft power.
But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy separated from a concept
of strategy can sustain a world order. And Europe has not yet given
itself attributes of statehood, tempting a vacuum of authority
internally and an imbalance of power along its borders. At the same
time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved into sectarian and ethnic
components in conflict with each other; religious militias and the
powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at will, producing
the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their own territory.
The
challenge in Asia is the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power
principles prevail unrelated to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving
some disagreements to the edge of confrontation.
The
clash between the international economy and the political institutions
that ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose
necessary for world order. The economic system has become global, while
the political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state.
Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers.
Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile conflicting
national aims or ideals of world order.
This
dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by
periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin
America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in
2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have
few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those stuck
in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union's
southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least
obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system.
The
international order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent
on the success of globalization, but the process produces a political
reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A third failing of the current world
order, such as it exists, is the absence of an effective mechanism for
the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most
consequential issues. This may seem an odd criticism in light of the
many multilateral forums that exist—more by far than at any other time
in history. Yet the nature and frequency of these meetings work against
the elaboration of long-range strategy. This process permits little
beyond, at best, a discussion of pending tactical issues and, at worst, a
new form of summitry as "social media" event. A contemporary structure
of international rules and norms, if it is to prove relevant, cannot
merely be affirmed by joint declarations; it must be fostered as a
matter of common conviction.
The penalty
for failing will be not so much a major war between states (though in
some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into spheres of
influence identified with particular domestic structures and forms of
governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test its
strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle between
regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle between
nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the
various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.
These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a
radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage
for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one
country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could
produce a crisis for the rest of the world.
A
world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory
governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with
agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But
progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of
intermediary stages.
To play a
responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the
U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What
do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone?
What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage
in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is
the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the
application of these values depend on circumstance?
For
the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory
levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with
recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures and
views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are
examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be
sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside their
sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor
does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence
of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
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